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I. Introduction
Imagine you are an Iranian national who has recently legally arrived in
the United States to get a much desired college degree. You are excited to arrive
in Washington, D.C., the capital of the land of the free; free from discriminatory
* Candidate for J.D., Washington and Lee University School of Law, May 2008; B.A., Pennsylvania
State University, Schreyer Honors College, May 2004. I would like to thank Professor Joan Shaugnessy for all
of her help, encouragement and feedback. I would also like to thank my Mother, Ellen Sanders, for her
continuous support.
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distinctions and arbitrary laws that made life for you so difficult in the past.
Upon arrival, the United States government sends you an official letter
demanding that you immediately go to the Immigration and Naturalization
Services (INS) to be questioned on your living arrangements, reason for your
stay, and your continued status as a non-immigrant. You ask your classmate,
who happens to be a national of India, if he received the letter; he says no. You
immediately feel that the United States government suspects you of being a
terrorist and your feelings of fear and apprehension rise-the same feelings you
worked hard to leave behind.
The use of racial profiling by police in the United States automatically
has a negative connotation by many Americans. Unjust, arbitrary, and
ineffective are just some of the words that may come to mind. The negative
connotation is fully justified-racial profiling denies equal protection to people
simply because of a distinguishing characteristic such as race, not because of
illegal acts. Why is it then justified to single out and deny equal protection and
treatment to certain aliens, based solely on their race, ethnicity, or nationality?
This Note will answer the above question and discuss the possible
implications of a pending United Nations Human Rights Committee decision on
a case regarding racial profiling on United States' foreign policy.1 The case,
Lecraft v. Spain,2 questions the legality of profiling for immigration purposes.3
The petitioners claim that the profiling is against international law norms4 and
the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights. 5 This Note will first
describe the use of profiling in the United States through immigration policies
post 9/11. Section II will outline the policy on which our government relies for

I

See Lecraft v. Spain, Communication Submitted For Consideration Under the First Optional

Protocol to the International Covenant On Civil and Political Rights, Sept. 11, 2006, available at
www.justiceinitiative.org/db/resource2/fs/?file-id=1 8904 [hereinafter Lecraft Communication]; see also infra
note 2 and accompanying text (describing the Lecraft case further).
2
See Press Release, Open Society Justice Initiative, Groundbreaking Lawsuit Challenges Racial
Profiling By Police (Sept. 12, 2006), http:llwww.justiceinitiative.orgldb/resource2?res-id=103402 (last visited
Apr. 14, 2008) [hereinafter Lecraft Press Release] (describing the facts of the Lecraft case as involving an
African American woman of Spanish citizenship who was stopped by a National Police Officer in a train station
because he was under orders to "identify persons who 'looked like her,' adding, 'many of them are illegal
immigrants"') (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
3
See FABiA WONG, WOMEN's LINK WORLDWIDE (SPAIN), REPORT RE: 2006 DEVELOPMENTS 1

(2006), http://www.law.utoronto.ca/documents/ihrp/reportO6_Wong.doc (last visited May 8,2008) (explaining
that the Lecraft case is "the first case challenging the practice of racial profiling to be submitted to a human
rights tribunal," and articulating the petitioner's claim as challenging "the Spanish Constitutional Court
judgment which held that racial appearance is a legitimate indicator for immigration status, and as such, state
officials were allowed to target specific ethnic groups for identity checks") (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).

4
Customary international law is "a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a
sense of legal obligation." Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 102(2).
5
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 179, availableat
http://www2.ohchr.orgtenglish/law/pdf/ccpr.pdf.
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the justification of profiling aliens, mainly the Plenary Power Doctrine,6 despite
the fact that profiling subjects its victims to unequal treatment under the law.
Parts IV and V will point out why the Plenary Power Doctrine needs to be
changed to account for the evolving standards of equal treatment that both
domestic and international modem views demand that nations follow. Next, Part
VI will provide a detailed explanation of the case, Lecraft v. Spain7, which is
currently under review by the U.N. Human Rights Committee (HRC). Finally,
Part VII will discuss how the Judiciary and the Transnational Legal Process, in
conjunction with the HRC ruling, could affect United States' foreign policy by
limiting the absolute power given to the Executive and the Legislative branches
of our government through the Plenary Power Doctrine.
II. Incidents of Unequal Treatment and Profiling of

Aliens in the United States
Racial profiling in the United States is commonly linked to police
stopping African-Americans for traffic stops simply because they are black. The' 8
use of racial profiling for traffic stops is also known as "driving while black, ,
insinuating the only violation that a victim of racial profiling committed was that
they were black and on the road. 9 The victims of racial profiling are forced to
undergo searches, frisks, and interrogations based on their racial characteristics
instead of criminal behavior. 10
The aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on American
soil has expanded the traditional view of racial profiling of African-Americans to
include the racial/ethnic/nationality profiling of persons of Muslim, MiddleEastern, and South Asian descent." America's implementation of legislative
acts such as the USA PATRIOT Act, restrictions on the Freedom of Information
Act, and other anti-terrorist policies has allowed racial profiling to exist virtually
12
unchecked.
6

For a discussion of the Plenary Power Doctrine, see generally Hiroshi Motomura, ImmigrationLaw

After a Century of Plenary Power: PhantomConstitutionalNorms and Statutory Interpretation,100 YALE L.

J. 545, 550-60 (1990).
7
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.

8

See DAVID A. HARRIS, DRIVING WHILE BLACK: RACIAL PROFILING ON OUR NATION'S HIGHWAYS,

http://www.aclu.orglracialjustice/racialprofiling/15912pub 19990607.html (1999) (last visited Apr. 20,2008)
(describing what occurs when a person is stopped for "DWB" or driving while black) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
9
See id. (asserting that most stops are for pre-textual purposes).
10 See id.(describing several scenarios where people were stopped for a DWB).
11 See generally infra notes 17-45 and accompanying text.
12

See generallyKam C. Wong,The USA PATRIOTAct: A Policy ofAlienation, 12 MICH.J.RACE&

L. 161 (2006) (reviewing post 9/11 policies which have allowed for the large scale preventive detention of
Muslims and South Asians and a "nation's dismissive attitude towards human, civil, and constitutional rights in
the face of terrorist threats").
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The Department of Justice (DOJ) issued a statement in 2003
condemning the use of racial profiling for federal law enforcement.' 3 President
Bush is quoted as saying, in regards to racial profiling: "[fIt's wrong, and we
will end it in America. In doing so we will not hinder the work of our Nation's
brave police officers. They protect us every day-often at great risk. But by
stopping the abuses of a few, we will add to the public confidence that our police
officers earn and deserve.' 4 Additionally, former Attorney General John
Ashcroft is quoted as stating: "[U]sing race.., as a proxy for potential criminal
behavior is unconstitutional, and it undermines law enforcement by undermining
the confidence that people can have in law enforcement.' 5 However, the DOJ's
statement does allow for profiling as a tool for terrorist identification and in U.S.
immigration policies.16
One example of profiling used in U.S. immigration policy was the
implementation of The National Security Entry and Exit Registry System
(NSEERS), a nation-wide program developed by the DOJ and INS that ran
shortly after 9/11 until December 2003.17 NSEERS was developed in order to8
screen and track non-immigrants who posed increased national security risks.'
The NSEERS procedures mandated that non-immigrants needed to re-register9
and be fingerprinted if they remained in the United States over thirty days.'
Only certain non-immigrants from qualifying countries 20 were required to go
through the NSEERS Special Registration because they fulfilled an "intelligence
criteria, and22were identified by officials as presenting an "elevated national
security risk. ,
13
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, FACr SHEET: RACIAL PROFILING (June 17, 2003), http://www.usdoj.gov/
opa/pr/2003/June/racial-profiling-fact-sheet.pdf (last visited May 8, 2008) (denouncing the use of racial
profiling and establishing guidelines to aid in the enforcement of its prohibition) (on file with the Washington

and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
14
Id. at 1.
Is

Id.
See id. at 5 (stating "race and ethnicity may be used in terrorist identification," and explaining that
"given the incalculably high stakes involved in such investigations, federal law enforcement officers who are
16

protecting national security or preventing catastrophic events (as well as airport security screeners) may
consider race, ethnicity, alienage, and other relevant factors").
17

U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, PROTECING NATIONAL SECURITY AND

UPHOLDING PUBLIC SAFETY, PUBLIC INFORMATION ON SPECIAL REGISTRATION, http://www.ice.gov/

pi/specialregistration/index.htm (providing the procedures for foreign nationals entering the country).
Is See id. (stating that NSEERS was put in place "to keep track of those entering and leaving our
country in order to safeguard U.S. citizens and America's borders").
19
See id. (describing the special procedures and stating that "DHS suspended the automatic 30-day
and annual re-registration requirements for NSEERS" on December 2, 2003).
20
See id.(listing countries such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, and Syria).
21
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Attorney General Ashcroft Announces Implementation of the
First Phase of the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (Aug. 12, 2002),
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2002/AugustO2-ag-466.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2008) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
Id.
22
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The potential and actual use of ethnic and racial profiling to target
Middle-Eastern and South Asians through the NSEERS program was apparent.
The NSEERS program intentionally targeted citizens and nationals from MiddleEastern and South Asian countries.23 Many people who came to the NSEERS
facilities to re-register were then arrested and detained for minor infractions on
their visa stays.24 Traditionally, these minor visa infractions are a civil matter
and would not interrupt an alien's right to stay in the U.S. 25 Under the new
policies and subsequent expansion of FBI authority to arrest and detain aliens for
immigration procedures; however, the unsuspecting non-immigrants coming to
re-register were apprehended.26 The impact of the NSEERS program's profiling
of non-immigrants is best articulated by Samina Faheem, Executive Director of
the American Muslim Voice and Pakistan American Alliance: "This program
has created a culture of anxiety, humiliation, and despair in communities
throughout this country. It has made people feel like common criminals, to
register and re-register every time they
leave the country. We are wasting
27
precious resources on this program. ,
The suspected impact and abuses of the post-9/l1 policies on the
Muslim, Middle-Eastern, and South Asian communities became a quantified
reality with the release of a report by the Inspector General of the U.S.
Department of Justice.28 The investigation focused on the Pentagon/Twin
Towers Bombing (PENTTBOM) criminal investigation launched by the Federal
23

See Wong, supra note 12, at 192 ("As operated, the NSEERS program targeted citizens and

nationals from Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Egypt, Eritrea, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait,
Libya, Lebanon, Morocco, North Korea, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Somalia, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia,
the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen, though others have been involved.").
24
See id. at 192-94 (describing the impact of the "Special Registration" program on the Muslim
community, including personal accounts); see also MAX VANZI, CAL. SENATE OFFICE OF RESEARCH, THE

PATRIOT ACT: OTHER POST 9/11 ENFORCEMENT POWER AND THE IMPACT ON CALIFORNIA'S MUSLIM
COMMUNITIES 10 (2004), availableat http://sor.govoffice3.com (search full site for "Max Vanzi"; then follow
"2004 Publications" hyperlink; then follow The PATRIOT Act hyperlink under May 2004 heading) (describing
the procedures used in Special Registration and personal accounts of aliens arrested and detained after arriving
at the NSEERS facility to re-register) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice).
25
See VANZi, supra note 24, at 33 ("In recent times past, even being out of status, that is, remaining in
the country after a visa had lapsed, would not automatically jeopardize the immigrant's ability to remain in the
country.").
26
See id. ("An immigrant found to be out of status was often detained instantaneously and placed in
deportation proceedings, now called removal proceedings.").
27
American Muslim Perspective, Immigrants Targetedfor DeportationAfter Participatingin INS
Special Registration ProgramSpeak Out, July 1, 2003, http://www.civilrights.ghazali.net/html/body-acluamv-presser.html (last visited May 8, 2008) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and
Social Justice).
28 See generally U.S. DEP'TOFJUSTICE, OFFICEOFTHEINSPECTRGEN., SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES:
A REvIEw OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE
INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATrACKS (2003) (last visited May 8, 2008) [hereinafter SEPTEMBER 11
DETAINEES], http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0306/full.pdf (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of
Civil Rights and Social Justice).
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Bureau of Investigation. 29 The report disclosed the impact on civil rights and
problems with the implementation of post-9/1 1 terrorism policies.3 ° It found that
the government detained many people, citizens and aliens, of Middle-Eastern
descent as material witnesses or persons of interest based on no more than their
ethnicity, association with terrorists, or just anonymous clues. 31 Additionally, the
report concluded that the government's treatment of aliens held as detainees
violated various constitutional provisions. For example, with regard to Due
Process, the aliens had not received notice of the charges against them, endured
total communication blackout for weeks, were granted no legal representation,
and in some cases were exposed to full body restraints.32
The California Office of Research investigated the Federal
Government's handling of the war on terrorism, especially the personal
experiences and human costs of the government's tactics. 33 The investigation
revealed that many Muslims, South Asians, and Arab immigrants living in
California faced humiliation, embarrassment, and intrusion of privacy.34 The
California study blamed the mistreatment of the Muslim community on the broad
power granted to federal agents to investigate and conduct surveillance,
indefinite detentions, and delayed warrant searches.35 Members of Congress,
state and local governments, and various civil liberties groups called for the
repeal of certain provisions in the PATRIOT Act stating they violate
constitutional rights guaranteed by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments.3 6

29

See id. (discussing "PENTrBOM," the FBI investigation into the bombing of the World Trade

Centers and the Pentagon).
30
See Wong, supra note 12, at 187 (stating that the Office of the Inspector General's investigation was
one of "the most comprehensive reports conducted by the DOJ on problems with the implementation of post
9/11 anti-terrorism measures").
31
See SEPTEMBER I1 DETAINEES, supra note 28, at 15-17 (describing how arrests of citizens and
aliens were "quite general in nature" and included living in the same building or area as a suspected terrorist,
landlord and civilian reports of suspicious behavior by Arabs, and Middle-Eastern men arrested for having
"suspicious items" including pictures of the World Trade Center and other famous buildings).
32
See id. at 113-15 (describing the communication black-out); see also id. at 134 (discussing the lack
of access to legal counsel); id. at 125 (explaining the extensive security measures including subjecting alien

detainees to full restraints).
33 See VANzI, supra note 24, at 10 ("[The Senate Office of Research has examined the USA
PATRIOT Act and associated federal powers that the government acquired to protect the country against
domestic terrorism following the attacks of September 11, 2001.").
3
See id. (citing examples of "incidents of humiliation, embarrassment and intrusions upon the
privacy of Muslims, South Asian and Arab immigrants and, in several cases, American citizens" during the
period following the 9/11 terrorist attacks).
35 See id. at 13-14 (describing how many members of Congress, state and local governments, and
various civil liberties groups want to repeal parts of the Patriot Act for being unconstitutional).
36 See id at 14 (describing a legal challenge to the Patriot Act that states that "the PATRIOT Act, on its
face, threatens constitutional rights guaranteed by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth

Amendments").
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Both the Inspector General's investigation and the California Office of
Research investigation provide examples of personal accounts of profiling. In
the Inspector General's report there are specific instances of ethnic and racial
profiling where people were detained simply because they were Middle-Eastern
and engaging in a legal activity. For example, an alien was arrested as a 9/11
detainee after a caller told the FBI that "two Arabs ' 3 7 who seemed "extremely
nervous" 38 rented a truck from the caller and only went a certain number of
miles. 39 Another example in the Inspector General's report described an alien
who was arrested as a September 11 th detainee because a caller told the FBI that
the grocery store where the alien worked at was run by many Middle-Eastern
men and it was "too many to run a small store."40
This post-9/1 I complacency towards constitutional rights violations was
not only apparent in law enforcement and federal agencies; the American public
began to accept profiling for potential terrorists. 4' Before 9/11, about eighty
percent of the American public thought it was wrong for law enforcement to use
profiling techniques which ultimately targeted African-Americans.4 2 However,
after the 9/11 attacks, sixty percent favored
racial profiling, "at least as long as it
43
Muslims.
and
Arabs
at
directed
was
Top ranking government officials also seemed to feel national security
measures permitted the use of profiling. The Chairman of Homeland Security,
Peter King, recently stated that airport screeners should not be hampered by
"political correctness."44 He went on to endorse the practice of "requiring people
of Middle-Eastern and South Asian decent to undergo additional security
checks" because of their race or religion.4 5 Moreover, when an alleged plot was
revealed to blow up U.S. bound planes coming from England, King was quoted
as saying "if the threat is coming from a particular group, I can see why it would

37

SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES, supra note 28, at 17.

Id.
39 See id ("Another alien treated as a September 11 detainee was arrested at his apartment in a few
days after a caller told the FBI that "two arabs" rented a truck from his vehicle rental business ... then returned
it minutes later having only gone miles.").
40 Id.
38

41

See RONALD WE1TzER & STEVEN TUCH, RACE AND POLICING IN AMERICA:

CONFLICT AND

REFORM (Cambridge University Press 2006) (noting that Americans became more accepting of racial profiling
after September 11, 2001).

42 See DAVID COLE & JAMES DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITTMON: SACRIFICING CIVIL
LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY 168 (The New Press 2002) (noting the vast majority of

Americans were against profiling before September 11, 2001).
43

Id.

44 J. Jioni Palmer, King EndorsesEthnic Profiling,NEWSDAY, Aug. 17, 2006, http://www.newsday.
com/news/nationworld/nation/ny-uskingO817,0,1253522.story?coll-ny-leadnationalnews-headlines (last visited
May 2, 2008 ) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
45

Id.
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make sense to single them out for further questioning. ,46 King has previously
stated that while not all Muslims are terrorists, all terrorists have been Muslim,
so he favors an "ethnic and religious" profiling scheme.47
Even though national security is a major concern, the United States must
remember, as stated in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,48 that "it is during our most
challenging and uncertain moments that our Nation's commitment to due process
is most severely tested and it is in those times that we must preserve our
commitment at home to the principles we fight abroad.... 4 9 In accordance
with the sentiment stated in Hamdi, many top ranking government officials have
stood up against the use of racial profiling for national security means. 50 In the
same article where King is quoted as approving racial profiling, NYPD
Commissioner Ray Kelly stated that racial profiling is "'nuts' and 'ineffective'5
and [he] eliminated the practice when he oversaw the U.S. Customs Service." '
Former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales also stated that he does not favor the
practice of profiling.5 2 Ahmed Younis, of the Muslim Public Affairs Council,
said that besides being ineffective, profiling ostracizes a community that could
be essential in helping combat terrorism: "In many ways, it is allowing the
terrorists what they want, which is the betrayal of our constitutional principles
and the disenfranchisement of the communities
that we need the most in the war
53

against extremism and terrorism.

4
47

Id.

51
52

Id.

Id. ("King, who has said that all Muslims aren't terrorists but that all recent terrorists are Muslim,
favors an ethnic and religious profiling scheme that would include foreign and American-born travelers.").
48 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). In Hamdi, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the
dismissal of a habeas corpus petition of a U.S. citizen who was being detained indefinitely as an illegal enemy
combatant. Id. at 533. The issue was whether U.S. citizens who are designated as illegal enemy combatants
have a right to challenge their detainment under the due process clause. Id. at 510. Hamdi was captured in
Afghanistan in 2001, and the U.S. claimed that he was fighting for the Taliban. Id. Hamdi was held in
Guantanamo Bay and then eventually transferred to a Brig in Charlestown, South Carolina. Id. In 2002,
Hamdi's father filed a habeas petition. Id. at 511. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
ordered that Hamdi receive access to a federal public defender. Id. at 512. The Fourth Circuit reversed the
District Court's order. id. After the Fourth Circuit denied a rehearing petition, Hamdi's father appealed to the
Supreme Court. Id. at 512. Eight of the Nine justices agreed that the executive branch does not have the power
to hold a U.S. citizen indefinitely without due process. Justice O'Connor wrote the plurality opinion which
states that due process required that Hamdi be allowed to challenge his detention. Id. Using the three-prong
test in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), Justice O'Connor stated that in this case, due process
required notice of the charges and an opportunity to be heard. Hamdi at 533. She also stated that Hamdi had
the right to access to counsel. Id. The Court held that U.S. citizens who are designated as "illegal enemy
combatants" have a right to challenge their detainment under the due process clause. Id. at 535.
49 Id. at 532.
5o See Palmer, supra note 44 (citing government officials opposed to racial profiling).
53

Id. (quoting Gonzales as saying that racial profiling is "problematic").
Id.
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Il. Why Profiling is PermittedWhen Applied to Aliens: An Overview of
Immigration Law in the United States
This Part will shed light on why the Fourteenth Amendment does not
fully protect aliens from racial/ethnic/nationality profiling under United States'
immigration law. The following overview of cases allowing laws to be enforced
in the immigration context, despite constitutional defects, molds the plenary
power given to the Executive and the Legislative branches of our government.
In Chae Chan Ping v. United States,54 commonly referred to as the
Chinese Exclusion Case, a U.S. customs officer refused to allow the Appellant, a
legal alien, to return to California after a trip to China and was detained in his
vessel at the California port.55 The appellant was refused access because of a
recent act of Congress that prohibited Chinese laborers from reentering the
United States after having once departed.56 Congress justified the Act on
China's violation of a treaty between the U.S. and China.57
Appellant filed a petition alleging that his liberty was unlawfully
restrained and asked for a writ of habeas corpus. 58 The Supreme Court held that
the exclusion of appellant was valid, that the power of exclusion of foreigners is
and that
granted to the executive and legislative branches of our government,
59
such determinations are not to be questioned by the judiciary.
In Korematsu v. United States,60 petitioner, an American citizen of
Japanese ancestry, was convicted for remaining in a portion of a military area
from which persons of Japanese ancestry were excluded.61 Petitioner asked the
Supreme Court to review the judgment affirming his conviction, arguing that the
62
exclusion order as applied only to those of Japanese ancestry was unlawful.

Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
Id. at 582 (discussing the facts of the case).
56
See id. at 597 (stipulating that the arrival of Chinese laborers to the United States is suspended for a
period of ten years after ninety days from the passage of the act).
57 See id. at 589 ("The existence of war... might have justified the refusal of permission to land.
Anything which... destroys or suspends the operations of a contract, would have been effective.... The
exclusion act.., was invoked by way of justification.").
59 See id. at 582 ("[A] petition on [Appellant's] behalf was presented ... alleging that he was
unlawfully restrained of his liberty, and praying that a writ of habeas corpus might be issued .... ).
59
See Chae ChanPing, 130 U.S. at 606-11 ("The government, possessing the powers which are tobe
exercised for protection and security, is clothed with authority to determine the occasion on which the powers
shall be called forth; and its determination, so far as the subjects affected are concerned, are necessarily
conclusive upon all its departments and officers.").
60
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
61
See id. at 215-16 ("The petitioner... was convicted in a federal district court for remaining in... a
'Military Area,' contrary to Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34... which directed that after May 9, 1942, all
persons of Japanese ancestry should be excluded from that area.").
62
See id.at 218 (stating that petitioner urged the court to reconsider prior conclusions and to find that
the Act at issue was unnecessary).
54
55
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The Supreme Court held that the exclusion order was valid and based their
decision on their previous holding in Hirabayashiv. United States.63
The Hirabayshicase attacked the 1942 Act of Congress which provided
for the implementation of various exclusion orders by the Executive, including
curfews and area restrictions for people of Japanese descent, as being an
"unconstitutional delegation of power."64 The Supreme Court upheld the curfew
exclusion orders and stated that it was within the proper "power of the
government to take steps necessary to prevent espionage and sabotage in an area
threatened by Japanese attack."60 The Korematsu Court determined that, like a
curfew, the exclusion of people of Japanese origin was necessary because "it was
impossible to bring about an immediate segregation of the disloyal. "66 Further,
the Court stated that "[i]n light of the principles we announced in the
Hirabayashicase, we are unable to conclude that it was beyond the war power of
67
Congress and the Executive to exclude those of Japanese ancestry. ,
Both the Political Question Doctrine and Plenary Power Doctrine need
to be discussed to understand the extent to which the Executive and Legislative
branches of government are able to make unconstitutional policies in regards to
domestic immigration laws that ultimately have an effect on foreign relations.
The holdings in Korematsu and Hirabayashidemonstrate the use of the
Political Question Doctrine, 68 a doctrine of judicial abstention, which gives the
branches unfettered discretion in the manner the laws are executed and taking
action that possibly abridges constitutional freedoms as long as they involve
foreign relations. The Political Question Doctrine is very similar to Plenary
Power Doctrine because both allow the Executive and Legislative branch to go
unchecked when acting in the sphere of foreign relations and immigration,
respectively. With regard to many foreign relations and immigration related
laws, the court has ruled that it is not appropriate for the judiciary to interfere
69
based on the two doctrines.

Id. at 217 ("[W]e are unable to conclude that it was beyond the war power of Congress and the
Executive to exclude those of Japanese ancestry from the... war area."); Hirabayashiv. United States, 320
U.S. 81 (1943).
64
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217.
65
Id.
63

SId.
67

at 219.

Id. at 217.

68
For a discussion of the Political Question Doctrine, see Patrick M. Garry, A Different Modelfor the
Rightto Privacy: The PoliticalQuestion Doctrineas a Substitutedfor Due Process,61 U. MIAMI L. REv. 169,

170-78 (2006) (discussing the history of the doctrine).
69
See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 996 (1979) (holding that whether President Carter could
unilaterally break a defense treaty with the Republic of China without Senate approval was a nonjusticiable
political question); see also Baker v. Car, 369 U.S. 186, 210-11 (1962) (discussing in depth the political
question doctrine).
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Although the Korematsu Court firmly stated that "legal restrictions
which curtail the civil rights of a single group are immediately suspect," thus the
review of the law goes under rigid scrutiny, "pressing public necessity" may
justify the existence of such restrictions, but racial antagonism never can. 70
However, the Court's holding allows racial profiling based not only on
nationality but ancestry, if the Executive or Legislative branches deems the
practice a public necessity. 71 The Plenary Power Doctrine was recently upheld
when applied to a current situation involving the discriminatory treatment of
Middle-Eastern aliens in the D.C. Circuit case Narenjiv. Civiletti.72 The Narenji
case was an appeal from a judgment of the District Court declaring
unconstitutional a regulation which required all post-secondary nonimmigrant
alien students who are natives or citizens of Iran to report to a local INS office or
campus representative to "provide information as to residence and maintenance
of nonimmigrant status. 7 3 The District Court declared the regulation
"unconstitutional because it violates the Iranian students' right to equal
74
protection of the laws.
The D.C. Circuit Court disagreed with the District Court's finding that
there was a "discriminatory classification. 7 5 They stated "distinctions on the
basis of nationality may be drawn in the immigration field by the Congress or the
Executive . .. "76 The Circuit Court reasoned that because the Iranian
government has used lawless conduct, the controversy involving Iranian students
in the United States lies in the field of our country's foreign affairs and
77
implicates matters over which the President has direct constitutional authority.

The Circuit Court applied a rational basis review to the regulation because
precedent has held that classification among aliens based upon nationality are
consistent with due process and equal protection if supported by a rational
basis. 78 The Narenji case cited the Supreme Court case Curtiss-Wright79 to
further support its holding that the President has full authority in foreign

70 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
71 See id. at 215 (stating that under situations of "emergency or peril" such classifications are
acceptable).
72 Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (stating the Court's current jurisprudence
regarding the Plenary Power Doctrine).
73 Id. at 746.
74 id. at 747.
75 Id.
76
Id. at 745.
77
Id. at 748.
78 See Narenji, 617 F.2d at 748 (supporting the use of rational basis review based on the holdings in
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1970) and Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977)).
79 United States v. Curtis-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
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relations measures. 80 Curtiss-Wrightreasoned that it is not the job of the courts
8
to pass judgment on decisions the President makes in foreign policy. '
IV. Why the PlenaryPower Doctrine Should be Modified to Prevent
DiscriminatoryProfilingof Aliens

The rationale behind the plenary power given to the political branches of
our government is antiquated and should be revised to incorporate the global
standards of human rights laws. In Chae Chan Ping v. U.S.,82 in reaching the
conclusion that the judiciary does not have the power to pass judgment on the
political branches decisions regarding foreign affairs, the Supreme Court
expressed underlying hostility and racial animus towards the Chinese laborers:
[T]hese laborers readily secured employment, and, as domestic
servants, and in various kinds of outdoor work, proved to be
exceedingly useful. For some years little opposition was made to
them ...but as their numbers increased, they began to engage in

various mechanical pursuits and trades, and thus came in competition
with our artisans and mechanics, as well as our laborers in the field.
The competition between them and our people was for this reason
altogether in their favorer, and the consequent irritation, proportionately deep and bitter, was followed, in many cases, by open
conflicts, to the great disturbance of the public peace. The differences
of race added greatly to the difficulties of the situation.... [T]hey
remained strangers in the land, residing apart by themselves, and
adhering to the customs and usages of their own country. It seems

80

Narenji at 748.

See Curtis-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. at 320 (stating the president is in a better position than
the courts because the President has the opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign
countries; i.e. his confidential sources of information and his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and
other officials). The defendant, Curtiss-Wright, was charged with illegally selling arms to Bolivia at a time
when the President had issued a temporary prohibition on the sale of weapons to certain countries due to their
involvement in the Chaco War. Id. at 311. A joint resolution of Congress had been approved on May 28, 1934,
which gave the President the authority to issue such a broad commercial prohibition. Id. at 312. The Supreme
Court rejected the defendant's argument, stating that there was "sufficient warrant for broad discretion vested in
the President to determine whether the enforcement of the statute will have a beneficial effect upon the
reestablishment of peace in the affected countries." Id. at 329.
82
Chae Chan Ping v. U.S., 130 U.S. 581,594-95 (1889). This case came forth on appeal, on a writ of
habeas corpus, which the Supreme Court denied by refusing to intervene and release the appellant from his
alleged unlawful detention in the main marine harbor of San Francisco, California. Id. at 581. The appellant
was not a U.S. citizen, but was instead a subject of the emperor of China. Id. at 582. The Supreme Court
openly expressed thinly veiled hostility and racial discrimination towards Chinese laborers with its ruling that
the judiciary lacks the authority to pass judgment on the political branch's foreign affairs decisions. Id at 59495.
81
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impossible for them to assimilate with our
83 people, or to make any
change in their habits or modes of living.

The result of the Chinese Exclusion Case seemed to be more about
keeping the Asian race out of the United States than exerting control as a
sovereign nation. The case is criticized for being based mostly on racist views.84
The Jim Crow laws, which were designed to exclude those of African Descent
from American society, have been compared to the laws excluding Asian
immigrants upheld in Chae Chan Ping.85 Both the Jim Crow laws and the laws
upheld in Chae Chan Ping were supported by a Supreme Court that believed in
racial separation. The plenary power cases, such as Chae Chan Ping, reflect
values deeply at odds with those of contemporary society.8 6 Further, the
government's rationale behind the discriminatory measures in Korematsu,that it
was "impossible to bring about an immediate segregation of the disloyal from the
loyal,, 87 thus validating the exclusion of the whole group, would most likely not
be tolerated in contemporary society. The landmark cases of the Civil Rights
movement show that contemporary society will not tolerate separation based on
racial/ethnic distinctions. 88 Recent interpretations of the Equal Protection
doctrine require that all people (not just citizens) be given the equal protection of
the law and no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law. 89
The Equal Protection doctrine would require a very different analysis
than what the Korematsu Court used. Although preventing terrorism is a
compelling government interest, under strict scrutiny, a racially discriminatory
act or law is only permissible if it is absolutely necessary to further that interest. 90
David Cole's article, which criticizes the use of racial profiling in the name of
national security, calls into doubt the effectiveness of ethnic profiling by using
so-called "substitution effects." 91 Substitution effects question to what extent
83
84

Id. at 594-95 (emphasis added).
See Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation'sLast Stronghold: Race Discriminationand the Constitutional

Law of Immigration,46 UCLA L. REV. 1(1998) (explaining how Congress has not hesitated to use the plenary
power recognized by the Supreme Court to discriminate).
85
Id. at 25 ("There is a limited but genuine similarity between treatment of Asians and African
Americans in the late nineteenth century.")
86 Id. at 72 ("[Chae Chan Ping] incorrectly expressed due process limitations on the federal
immigration power because they exiled residents in ways now readily seen as unfair.").
87 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944).
88 See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (demonstrating legal precedent for society's
intolerance towards racial segregation).
89 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
90

David Cole, The Poverty of Posner'sPragmatism:Balancing Away Liberty After 9/11, 59 STAN. L

REV. 1735, 1744 (2007).
91 See id at 1743-44 (agreeing with Richard Posner's analysis of ethnic profiling which observes that
whether profiling a suspect group will actually make us safer depends in part on "substitution effects").
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paying closer attention to Arab and Muslim aliens will "make it easier for people
who do not fit that profile to elude detection. '9 2 Cole further argues that
constitutional law should not leave the question of profiling to the political
process because it has done such a poor job of protecting racial minorities in the
past: "Constitutional principles protect those who are likely to be the targets of
such tyranny, such as terror suspects, religious and racial minorities, criminal
defendants, enemy combatants, foreign nations, and, especially in this day and
age, Arabs and Muslims.,,93 This is another strong argument for the modification
of the Plenary Power Doctrine to prohibit profiling and general discrimination.
Recently, the D.C. District Court in Narenjiused rational basis review,
allowing the discriminatory law towards the non-immigrant school children to
stand. The law most likely could not have withstood strict scrutiny. 94 The Court
justified the use of the rational basis test by citing past cases which held that
"classifications among aliens based upon nationality are consistent with due
process and equal protection if supported by a rational basis." 9 5 The reasoning,
however, like the justification in Korematsu which stated it is difficult to
separate the loyal from the disloyal, is antiquated.
There are two main problems with adapting a rational basis test for
discriminatory treatment based on nationality. First, profiling laws that on their
face focus on nationality but in application discriminate based on race or
ethnicity have a disparate impact. These profiling laws and regulations are
applied to all people who look like they are from a certain nation; for example, a
who look Middle-Eastern under the guise of
law can specifically target all people
96
nationality.
their
targeting
a law
Second, the international view that discriminating based on nationality is
acceptable behavior for a nation to engage in has changed, as discussed in-depth
below.97 The D.C. Circuit Court in Narenji may be viewed as contradicting
itself by stating "any rule of constitutional law that would inhibit the flexibility
of the political branches of government to respond to changing world conditions
Id at 1744.
Id. at 1747.
See Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745,747 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (stating that the District Court's finding
that the regulation was unconstitutional because it violated the Iranian students' right to equal protection of the
laws was in error and the regulation must be sustained as long as such distinctions are not wholly irrational).
95 See id. at 748 (citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81-82 (1970) and Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787
(1977)).
9
See SEPTEMBER II DETAINEES, supra note 28 (alleging that both the Inspector General's
investigation and the California Senate of Research investigation provided examples of personal accounts of
ethnic and racial profiling).
97 See generally, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 5, art. 26;
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted and openedfor
signatureDec. 21, 1965,660 U.N.T.S. 212, 218, availableat http://www2.ohchr.orglenglish/law/pdf/cerd.pdf;
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, entered into force Oct. 4, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
92

93
94
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should be adopted only with the greatest caution. ' 98 The Plenary Power
Doctrine, which the Narenji court relied upon, is a rigid doctrine that does not
allow judicial review of any kind to the Executive and the Legislative branch, is
of the very same breed of policy that the Court warns against. The Doctrine
limits the courts from the ability of checking that our political branches are
responding to changing world conditions. The Plenary Power Doctrine does not
allow our government, as a whole, to respond to changing world norms on
discrimination.
V. CurrentInternationalView on the Use of Profiling
Contemporary society in the United States has denounced racial and
ethnic separation as a justifiable interest to support United States laws. 99
Additionally, "the notion that an inherent part of national sovereignty is the
power to discriminate against aliens on the basis of race is no longer a part of
international law."'1
Support for the changing view of international law
regarding the right to exclude aliens based on race includes the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(ICERD).' 0° The ICERD, to which United States is a signatory, broadly
prohibits discrimination by having the nations commit "to engage in no act or
practice of racial discrimination against persons, groups of persons, or
institutions and to ensure that all public authorities ... shall act in conformity
with this obligation."' 02 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that
"[e]veryone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration,
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status."' 10 3 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights°4 (ICCPR), to
which the United States is also a party, prohibits discrimination.'
Narenji, 617 F.2d at 748.
See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495-96 (1954) (stating generally that separation
based on race is not equal and therefore unconstitutional).
98
99

10o

Chin, supra note 84, at 60.

101 International Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra note 97.
10 Id. art. 2(1).
103
See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(I), art. 2, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) (stating further that "no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political,
jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be
independent, trust, non-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty").
104
Article 26 of the ICCPR prohibits discrimination with regard to the civil and political rights listed
therein:
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal
protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all
persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour,
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Additional prohibitions against discrimination apply to the treatment of
aliens as well as citizens. The Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, which
the United States has ratified, requires that benefits be offered to refugees
"without discrimination as to race, religion or country of origin."105 The Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War prohibits "any adverse
distinction based on race, nationality, religious belief or political opinions, or any
other distinction founded on similar criteria."' 106 Under the Third Restatement of
States, systematic racial discrimination"
the Foreign Relations Law of the United
07
violates customary international law.'
It is important to note that recently enacted international law prohibits
discrimination based on race, ethnicity and nationality. The ICCPR and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights expressly prohibits unequal treatment
based on race, color, sex, religion, and national or social origin.108 Additionally,
the Geneva Convention provision focusing on Prisoners of War prohibits
discrimination based on race or nationality. 109
Contemporary global society begs that equal protection be applied to
immigration laws, the Plenary Power Doctrine notwithstanding. Critics may
argue that the plenary power of Congress and the Executive should not be
governed by international law. However, the reasoning behind the plenary
power expressed in Curtiss-Wright,which bolstered the Plenary Power Doctrine
and which the D.C. Circuit relied upon in Narenji v. Civiletti,110 was based on
international law.
In Curtiss-Wright the Supreme Court said "the power to expel
undesirable aliens" stems from sovereignty itself rather than the Constitution."11
Hence, the Court explained that the scope of that power could be found "not in
the provisions of the Constitution, but in the law of nations."" 2 Since
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 5,art. 26.
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 97.
Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
107
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702(0
105

106

(1987) ("A state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages, or condones..
*systematic racial discrimination ....).
108 See infra note 104 (restating Article 26, i.e. the non-discrimination clause, of the ICCPR).
109 See Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 106, art. 3 (citing
the Convention for the proposition that "any adverse distinction based on race, nationality, religious beliefs or
political opinions, or any other distinction founded on similar criteria" is prohibited).
10

See Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745,748 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright

Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936), for the proposition that it is not the business of the courts to pass judgment
on the decisions of the President in the field of foreign policy).
I
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. at 318.
112 Id. (emphasis added).
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international law provided the background and a justification for the
establishment of the Plenary Power Doctrine, courts should look at the current
norms expressed by international law to ensure that United States' foreign policy
conforms.
VI. Lecraft v. Spain: Backgroundand Details of the Case Pending Before
the UnitedNations Human Rights Committee
The use of profiling as a tool of law enforcement is also a problem in
numerous European countries. 1 3 Profiling is used in many different ways
throughout Europe, including "disproportionate and arbitrary identity checks,
stops and searches of members of ethnic minority groups, and increased
patrolling of ethnic minority neighborhoods." ' 14 The profiling in Europe is
strikingly similar to the racial/ethnic/nationality profiling used in the United
States in immigration policies to target terrorists.
In 2005, the Open Society Justice Initiative, a non-governmental
organization (NGO), and its Spanish partner Grupo de Estudios y Alternativas
21, conducted an in-depth study to investigate the use of ethnic profiling by
Spanish law enforcement agents. 15 The Study found that ethnic profiling was
being used profusely by Spanish law enforcement.1 16 It also found that racial
and ethnic profiling "promote[d] a self-fulfilling prophecy that justifies the initial
hypothesis that minorities commit more crimes." 1 7 Further, the study found that
immigrants in Spain are treated less respectfully during stops than members of
the majority, and that "supervision and indicators of police practice efficiency in
Spain appear[ed] to be weak or sometimes non existent," even though such
practices were more effective means of targeting stops than racial and ethnic
profiling. 118 Ethnic minorities and immigrants confirmed the study's findings,
119
reporting that they were stopped more frequently than non-minorities.
113

See DANIEL WAGMAN & BEGONJA PERNAS, ETHNIC PROFILING IN SPAIN: INVESTIGATIONS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS, GRUPO DE ESTUDIOS Y ALTERNATPVAS 21, June 2, 2005, http://www.justiceinitiative.

org/db/resource2?resjid=103400 (follow "Ethnic Profiling in Spain: Investigations and Recommendations"
hyperlink) (last visited May 8, 2008) (describing ethnic profiling and its various manifestations) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
114

115
116

Id.
See id. (engaging in the study to "raise awareness and increase understanding of ethnic profiling").
See id. at 33 (stating that "even by their own admission, police officers at every law enforcement

level (municipal, regional and national) stop and arrest ethnic minorities and immigrants more often than they
do Spaniards").
117

Id. at 34.

118 Id.
119
Id. at 33 (reporting that ethnic minorities and immigrants agreed with the police assessment thatthey
were stopped more frequently than non-minorities; some said they were stopped on a daily basis. Minorities
also reported that they knew of the visual and behavioral cues tied to their ethnic minority that prompted police

to stop them).
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The pending case, Lecraft v. Spain, challenges a ruling by the Spanish
Constitutional Court which held that police could target blacks for identity
checks using their racial appearance as a "proxy for immigration status.' 20 This
case stands to be an announcement by the HRC that profiling is a form of
intolerable discrimination, and perhaps a catalyst for change in the United States.
In 2001, the Spanish Constitutional Court condoned the police practice of
relying on specific physical or racial characteristics as "reasonable indicators of
the non-national origin of the person who possesses them."' 12 1 The Court
reasoned that racial criteria are "merely122indicative of the greater probability that
the interested party was not Spanish."'
The facts of the case are as follows: Lecraft is an African-American
woman of naturalized Spanish citizenship. 123 She was stopped and asked for
identity documents by a National Police officer at the Valladolid railway station
in 1992.124 The National Police officer targeted Lecraft from the crowd on the
platform: No other passengers on the platform were asked to provide
documentation of identity. 125 When Lecraft and her husband demanded an
explanation for the identity check, the officer explained that he was obligated to
check the identity of persons who "looked like her," stating that "many of them
are illegal immigrants."' 126 The officer further clarified that he was obeying the
Ministry of the Interior, which ordered National Police officers to conduct
identity checks on "persons of color." 127 In response to the officer's continued
requests for identification, Lecraft' s husband told the officer that his request for
identification solely based on Lecraft's skin color "constituted racial
discrimination."128 The officer denied that he was participating in racial
discrimination and justified his actions to check certain people's identity
29
documents "due to the high number of illegal immigrants residing in Spain." 1
Lecraft and her husband repeatedly asked to see the police officer's own
identification, informing him that they intended to file a complaint with the
120

See Lecraft Communication, supra note 1 ("[Als applied, this legislation generates a

disproportionate impact upon persons of the 'black race' and/or anyone else with 'specific physical or ethnic
characteristics' considered to be 'indicative' of non-Spanish nationality."); Lecraft Press Release, supra note 2
("The application challenges a ruling by the Spanish Constitutional Court which held that police could target
blacks for identity checks because racial appearance is a proxy for immigration status.").
121 Lecraft Press Release, supra note 2 (citing the Spanish Constitutional Court's decision).
122 Lecraft Communication, supra note 1, at 10 (citing the Spanish Constitutional Court Judgment STC
Jan. 29, 2001 (R.J., No. 13/2001).
123 See id.at 2 (setting forth information concerning Lecraft).
124 See id. at 6 (describing the facts of the Lecraft case).
125 See id. ("The National Police Officer did not ask her husband, son, or any other passengers on the
platform for their identity documents.").
126
Id.
127
id.
12' Id. (describing the encounter between Lecraft and the officer).
129
id.
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National Police. 130 The officer then took Lecraft and her husband from the
platform into an office where he recorded their identification information. 13 1 The
next day32Lecraft filed a complaint of racial discrimination against the National
Police. 1
After numerous appeals to the General Registry of the Ministry of the
Interior, Lecraft's complaint reached Spain's National Court on April 6, 1994.133
Two years later, in 1996, the National Court held that "residents in Spain have a
general obligation to identify themselves to public authorities, and that this
obligation forms part of the 'social contract.'" 134 The Court went on to state that
the identity check of Lecraft was "in accordance with the general application1 of
35
Spain's immigration laws as set forth in Royal Decree 1119, article 72..'
The Royal Decree authorizes police officers to demand identification from any
foreigners seeking to enter Spain. 136 The identity checks were also justified as
long as verification
of the persons' identities were necessary for "the protection
137
of security."
Lecraft's appeal of the National Court's decision to the Spanish
Constitutional Court was accepted on October 5, 1998.138 Lecraft argued that the
National Police Officer's actions violated her right to non-discrimination, the
right to liberty and security of person, the right to freedom of movement, the
right to effective judicial protection, and the right to a fair trial. 139 On January
29, 2001, the Constitutional Court agreed with the National Court's initial ruling
that Lecraft's identity stop, despite the fact that it was based on race/ethnicity,
did not violate Lecraft's fundamental rights. 14 Further, the Constitutional Court
found that the identification requirement did not "amount to 'patent,' or direct,
discrimination since there was no specific instruction to identify an individual of
a specific race.' 4' The Court explained that an individual's racial or ethnic
identity is a legitimate indicator of nationality, and thus, no per se discrimination

13o See id. ("The Applicant and her husband continued to insist on seeing the officer's badge and DNI,
informing him that they intended to lodge a complaint with the National Police.").
131 See id. ("The police officer subsequently led them to an office at the railway station, where he took
down the Applicant's and her husband's identification information.").
132
See id. at 6-7 (describing the complaint filed Dec. 7, 1992).
133
See id at 7-8 (documenting the complaints to the Ministry of the Interior).
134

Id.
Id.
136
See id. (describing the National Court's interpretation of the Spanish immigration laws, specifically
Royal Decree 1119/1986 of 26 May, Article 72.1, that permits police officers to demand identification from any
foreigners seeking to enter Spain).
137
Id. (describing the interpretation of Organic Law 1/92 on Citizen Security).
138
See id. at 8 (stating the date applicant's appeal was accepted).
139
See id. at 8-9 (detailing the appeal filed to the Constitutional Court).
140
See id. at 9 (noting that the Court in a six to one decision rejected Lecraft's claim).
135

141

Id.at 10.
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occurs when it is used in a descriptive manner. 142 The Court also found it
"necessary to recognize that when police controls serve the purpose [of enforcing
laws to protect citizen's security], specific physical or ethnic characteristics can
as reasonably indicative of the national origin of the
be taken into consideration
43
person who has them." 1

Represented by various human rights NGOs including Open Society
Justice Initiative, Women's Link Worldwide, and SOS Racismo-Madrid, Lecraft
has brought her case before the United Nations HRC. In her Submission for
Consideration, Lecraft argues that the police action breached her rights to nondiscrimination and freedom of movement and that "prohibition of racial
discrimination has become ajus cogens... of international law." 144 The United
Nations HRC has recognized these very rights: "Non-discrimination together
with equality before the law and equal protection of the law without any
discrimination, constitute a basic and general principle relating to the protection
actions violated
of human rights. 1 45 Lecraft contends that the National Police
46
law.'
international
in
recognized
as
her basic human rights
147
Lecraft bases her claim on Articles 2, 12(1) and 26 of the ICCPR.
Article 2(1) obligates each State party to respect and ensure to all persons within
its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the Covenant
without discrimination of any kind, "such as race, color, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status., 148 Article 26 of the ICCPR establishes the right to non-discrimination as
"in law or in fact in any field
an autonomous right by prohibiting discrimination
149
authorities.,
public
by
protected
regulated and
Lecraft finds further support for her claim in the General Comments of
the ICCPR. The ICCPR prohibits both direct and indirect discrimination, as
stated in the Human Right's Committee's General Comments:
The Committee believes that the term "discrimination" as used in the
Covenant should be understood to imply any distinction, exclusion,
restriction or preference which is based on any ground such as race,
142

See id. (characterizing how the Constitutional Court dealt with the issue of whether or not an

assumption about national identity based on race was per se discriminatory).
143

144
145

Id. at 10-11.
Id. at 11-12.

See id. at 12 (incorporating in her Communication language from the United Nations Human Rights

Committee, General Comment No. 18: Non-Discrimination,1 1, U.N. Doc. A/45/40 (Oct. 11, 1989).
146 Id. at 3 ("This case involves multiple violations of the ICCPR, including the rights to nondiscrimination on the basis of race, colour, national or social origin, or other status, and freedom of movement ...").

147 See id. at 23 (specifying which Articles of the ICCPR Lecraft contends that Spain violated).
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 5, art. 2(1).
'48
149 Id. art. 26.
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colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or other status, and which has the
purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition enjoyment
or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and
freedoms. 5 °
51
The U.N. HRC recently accepted Lecraft v. Spain for review.'
Currently, the Applicants have not heard any further information regarding when
the case will be heard before the Committee. 52 Informal sources have confirmed
that Spain received notification but have yet to respond to the communication
53
submitted for consideration to the ICCPR regarding Lecraft v. Spain.'
The Executive Director of the Open Society Justice Initiative feels
strongly that "this case is important because racial and religious minorities are
increasingly being subjected to police stops and scrutiny.
We are asking the
154
HRC to make clear that racial profiling is unlawful."'

VII. PotentialImpact of U.N. Human Rights Committee Ruling in Lecraft v.
Spain on the United States' Use of ProfilingAliens
The arguments being brought before the HRC in Lecraft v. Spain for
why racial profiling is against international law and the ICCPR are similar to
those for the modification of the Plenary Power Doctrine, which would allow the
judiciary to prohibit the executive and legislative branches from making laws
that allow the profiling of aliens. 155 Those similar arguments allege that certain
aliens targeted for profiling are not given equal protection under the law, the
156
right to be free from discrimination, and the freedom of movement.
Additionally, the argument that direct or indirect discrimination violates the
ICCPR supports the prohibition of immigration laws that are justified in
nationality profiling, but have a disparate impact of racial/ethnical profiling.
Discussed below are ways in which the HRC's decision could affect the United
States' Plenary Power Doctrine, in particular the power given to the political
branches to make laws that have a the impact of discriminating against certain
aliens.
ISOU.N. Human Rights Committee,

GeneralComment No. 18: Non-Discrimination,1 1, U.N. Doc.

A/45/40 (Oct. 11, 1989) (emphasis added), available at http://www.unhchr.chltbs/doc.nsfl(Symbol)/
3888b0541f8501c9cl2563ed004b8d0e?Opendocument.
151 E-mail from Indira Goris, Representative for Rosalind Williams Lecraft through the Open Society
Justice Initiative (Oct. 4, 2007) (on file with author).
152

Id.

153

Id.

155
156

See supra notes 84-86 and 90-93 and accompanying text.
See Lecraft Communication, supra note 1 (alleging that racial profiling restricts these basic rights).
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If the HRC decides that profiling by police and other government agents
is not a violation of the ICCPR, the Unites States' recent practice of profiling
aliens for anti-terrorism measures will go on unhindered. If the HRC ruling
holds that the practice of racial or ethnic profiling is unlawful and a violation of
the ICCPR, however, then the ruling may have strong implications on 157
our
branches of government and subsequently on the Plenary Power Doctrine.
The HRC ruling will likely not have an immediate direct effect on the
United States' foreign policy. The United States Senate ratified the ICCPR in
June 1992.158 On its face, under the U.S. Constitution this condition may be
assumed, upon ratification by the Senate, to be "the Supreme Law of the
Land.' 59 However, the United States conditioned its consent to the ICCPR by
attaching reservations, understandings, and declarations (RUDs). 6° No RUDs
exist to Articles 2,161 12(1),162 and 26163 of the ICCPR.' 64 More importantly,
however, the United States took an exception to the treaty, stating it was not selfexecuting.165 The ramifications of the ICCPR not being a self-executing treaty
are that without an additional piece of legislation from Congress, an individual
66
citizen of the United States cannot base a claim on provisions of the ICCPR.'
157

See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 554 (2005) (using the international law rulings against the

death penalty to support the U.S. decision that death penalty for juveniles should not be lawful).
158
See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Ratification Status, httpJ/www2.ohchr.org
/english/bodies/ratification/4.htm (last visited May 8, 2008) (listing signature and ratification dates of all
signatory parties) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
159 See U.S. Const. art. VI ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land.").
160
See CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 424 (2d ed. 2005)
(describing the process of ratification subject to reservations).
161 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 5, art. 2(3)(a) ("Each State Party
to the present Covenant undertakes to ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are
violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons
acting in an official capacity.").
162 See id. art. 12(1) ("Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have
the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.").
163 See id. art. 26 ("All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to
the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all
persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground .... ).
164
See DECLARATIONS AND RESERVATIONS at 26-27 (2008), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/
bodies/ratification/docs/DeclarationsReservationslCCPR.pdf (setting forth Reservations made by the U.S. upon
ratification) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
165 Id. at 28 ("That the United States declares that the provisions of Articles I through 27 of the
Covenant are not self-executing.").
166 Christopher Harland, The Status of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) in the Domestic Law of State Parties: An Initial Global Survey Through UN Human Rights
Committee Documents, 22 Hum. Rts. Q. 187, at 253 (2000) (quoting Core Document Forming Part of the
Reports of States Parties: United States of America, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., addendum, 1134, U.N.
Doc. HRI/CORE/l/Add.49 (1994)) ("In the United States system, a treaty may be 'self-executing,' in which
case it may properly be invoked by private parties in litigation without any implementing legislation, or 'nonself-executing,' in which case its provisions cannot be directly enforced by the judiciary in the absence of
implementing legislation.").
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This means that even if the HRC finds that profiling violates provisions of the
ICCPR, a victim of profiling cannot sue the law enforcement agency responsible
for profiling under the ICCPR. Additionally, a victim of profiling in the United
States cannot file a complaint stating a violation of the ICCPR with the United
Nations HRC because the United States has not ratified the First Optional
Protocol to the ICCPR. 167 This basically allows official discriminatory actions to
go unchecked by judicial review, leaving the victim without recourse.
Not all hope is lost, however; an HRC holding in Lecraft v. Spain
announcing that racial profiling violates the treaty and is against international
law can still have a substantial impact on the laws in America, despite the
ICCPR not being self-executing. The first way that the HRC ruling can affect
U.S. law is for the U.S. court system to limit the Plenary Power Doctrine by
deciding, in a future case, that profiling of certain aliens is against customary
international law. 168 The HRC ruling will be used as evidence of such customary
international law. 169 Customary international law is a form of the "law of
nations" found in the Constitution under Art. 1 Section 8.170 Even though the
U.S. has made reservations on the ICCPR and declared the treaty not selfexecuting, the U.S. is still obligated to follow customary international law. 171
Further, customary international law makes no distinction between the treatment
of aliens and citizens. 172 The Supreme Court has looked at customary
international law as persuasive authority in the past to overturn statutes. 173

167

See First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/procedure.htm (last visited May 8, 2008) ("Communications...
cannot be considered unless they come from a person... subject to the jurisdiction of a state that is party to the
optional protocol.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); see also
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16,1966,999 U.N.T.S. 171,
http://www2.ohchr.orglenglish/bodies/ratification/5.htm (last visited May 8, 2008) (providing that, as of March
2008, the U.S. had not ratified the protocol) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and
Social Justice).

168 See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677,700 (1900) ("International law is part of our law, and must
be ascertained and administered by the courts ofjustice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right
depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.").
169 See Filartiga v. Pena-lrala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (1980) (stating that "customary international law
is
derived from the usage of nations, judicial opinions and the works of jurists...").
170 See U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8 ("Congress shall have Power to ...define and punish Piracies and
Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations.").
171 See Filartiga,630 F.2d at 882 (stating although the United Nations Charter was not wholly selfexecuting, "the prohibition [against torture] has become part of customary international law, as evidenced and
defined by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, General Assembly Resolution ....).
172 See id.at 884 (stating that official torture is prohibited by the law of nations and that the prohibition

is clear and unambiguous and admits no distinction between the treatment of aliens and citizens). Similarly, the
ICCPR makes no distinction between aliens and citizens.
173 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 554 (2005) (using the international law rulings against the
death penalty to support the U.S. decision that death penalty for juveniles should not be lawful).
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Moreover, the Supreme Court, in Lawrence v. Texas, 174 used
international law holdings to justify its holding. In Lawrence, the Supreme
Court cited both to British law and to a decision by the European Court of
Human Rights, stating that the decision of the European Court of Human Rights
(deciding that laws proscribing the conduct of sodomy were invalid) was
important to the sodomy case being brought in the United States because the
current U.S. law was
at odds with Western civilization; this was persuasive to the
175
Court's decision.
The second way that the HRC ruling on racial profiling will have an
impact on foreign policy, in particular the Plenary Power Doctrine, is through the
transnational legal process (Process). The Process helps answer why "almost all
nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their
obligations almost all the time." 176 The Process is defined as "the complex
process of institutional interaction whereby global norms are not just debated and
interpreted, but ultimately internalized by domestic legal systems." 177 The Process takes into account the "'regular interactions across national boundaries...
when at least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a
national government or an intergovernmental organization. Multinational
enterprises, nongovernmental organizations, and78private individuals re-emerg[e]
as significant actors on the transnational stage.0
The Process by which norm-internalization occurs has three phases. 179
The first stage is when one or more transnational actors "provoke an interaction
(or a series of interactions) with another, which forces an interpretation or
enunciation of the global norm applicable to the situation." 180 The HRC ruling
will be an interpretation of a global norm for the parties interacting and
174 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
175

See id. at 573 (describing the authority used to decide Lawrence). The court stated:

Of even more importance, almost five years before Bowers was decided the European Court of
Human Rights considered a case with parallels to Bowers and to today's case.... Authoritative in
all countries that are members of the Council of Europe (21 nations then, 45 nations now), the
decision is at odds with the premise in Bowers that the claim put forward was insubstantial in our
Western civilization.

Id. In Lawrence, plaintiff brought a case to strike down a Texas anti-sodomy law, claiming it was against the
Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 563. The Court used the decision of the European
Convention on Human Rights as persuasive evidence that the anti-sodomy law is not in line with what the rest
of Western civilization deems appropriate. Id. at 573. The Court held that the anti-sodomy law in Texas was
unconstitutional as applied. Id. at 585.
176 Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey InternationalLaw?, 106 YALE L. J. 2599,2599 (1997)
(quoting LOUIS HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAvE 47 (2d ed. 1979) (emphasis omitted)).
Id. at 2602.
"
Iid. at 2624.
179 See id. at 2646 (suggesting that the process can have three phases).
18o Id.
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discussing the ICCPR treaty.' 81 Second, during these interactions, "the moving
party seeks not simply to coerce the other party, but to internalize the new
interpretation of the international norm into the other party's internal normative
system.'"1 82 Third, these series of transactions generate a "legal rule that will
guide future transnational interactions between the partie[s], [and] future
transactions will further internalize those norms" and push for legislation and
internalization of the norm (for example, that profiling is wrong) in the United
States.183

Critics of the Process mainly favor an empirical balancing test for why
states will comply with international rules. 84 These critics feel the state's
interest is more focused on the cost-benefit analysis of following the rules
85
instead of the internalized norms of international players such as NGOs.1
Critics contend that whatever is in the state's best interest, rather than how
86
individuals feel about issues, is what guides a state to follow international law.'
This approach eliminates the human aspect of political dealings and
ignores the fact that a state's laws, especially a democratic state's, are created by
individuals who feel strongly about issues, including on a personal level, and are
not created simply by what individuals think will better advance a state
politically or economically. Additionally, the welfare and equal treatment of
citizens and people in the United States is a legitimate state interest that cannot
be decided based on a cost-benefit analysis because it is influenced by the
standards articulated by international law. Moreover, critics state that
international law is limited because it is "bounded by... state interests and the
distribution of power." 87 However, the United States is obligated by the

181 See id. at 2646 ("[The] interaction ... forces an interpretation or enunciation of the global norm
applicable to the situation.").

Id.
183 See id. (discussing generally the process in which the various interactions of international actors
182

generate an international legal rule).
184 See generallyJack Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, The New InternationalLaw Scholarship,34 GA. J.
INT'L & COmr'. L. 463 (2006) (summarizing the theory of international law written in the book The Limits of
InternationalLaw in stating that international law emerges from and is sustained by nations acting rationally to
maximize their interests, given their perception of the interests of other states, and the distribution of state
power). States' moral obligations under international law are described as a null set: "Nations have no moral
obligation to comply with international law, and liberal democratic nations have no duty to engage in the strong
cosmopolitan actions so often demanded of them." Id.; see generallyJACK L. GoLDSMrH & ERIC A. POSNER,
THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw (Oxford University Press 2005).
185 See Goldsmith & Posner, The New InternationalLaw Scholarship,supra note 187, at 467 ("When
international law changes, as it often does, it does so because state interests (again, state preferences over
international relations outcomes) change due (for example) to changes in technology, or in relative wealth, or in
domestic government.").
186 See id. (arguing that state interest is a prevalent motivating factor).
187

Id. at 468.
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Constitution to follow the laws of nations and not to do an empirical balancing
88
test as to whether it is in our best interest to follow international law.'
Further, the Process has worked in the past in the United States.'8 9 For
example, during the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty Reinterpretation Debate,
NGOs guided the Process and ultimately forced the United States to obey
internalized norms. 190 In 1972, "the United States and the U.S.S.R. signed the
bilateral Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty), which expressly banned
the development of space-based systems for the territorial defense of the United
States."'9' In 1985, the Reagan Administration proposed the development of a
space-based antiballistic missile system (Strategic Defense Initiative) for
American territorial defense. 92 The Reagan Administration tried to broadly
"reinterpret" the ABM Treaty to allow for the Strategic Defense Initiative,
"essentially amending the treaty without the consent of the Senate or the Soviet
Union." 193 This amendment upset many present and former government officials
and many NGOs. 194 These actors fought for the original interpretation of the
treaty that forbade the development of the Strategic Defense Initiative. 95 The
ABM Treaty controversy was discussed and argued at Senate hearings, debates96
over other arms control treaties, journal articles, and op-ed columns.
Consequently, Congress withheld appropriations for any Strategic Defense
Initiative testing that did not conform to the original ABM Treaty, and "the
Senate reported the ABM Treaty Interpretation Resolution, which reaffirmed its
original understanding of the treaty."' 97
It is easy to see how the HRC ruling stating that racial profiling is
unlawful and against the ICCPR could be adopted by many government officials
and NGOs as an internalized norm.1 98 These actors would eventually push for
the judicial, legislative, and executive branches to prohibit policies that allow for
188 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 (stating Congress has the power to define and punish offenses against the
"Law of Nations" and, arguably, to establish at least a minimum of international rights and duties of the United
States).
189 See Koh, supra note 176, at 2647-48 (explaining the success of the norm-internalization process
with regard to the Reagan Administration's "Star Wars" initiative).
190 Id. at 2647 (explaining how two NGOs, the Arms Control Association and the National Committee
to Save the ABM Treaty, aided the rally in support of the original, narrower, treaty interpretation as opposed to
the broader interpretation of the Reagan Administration).
191
Id.
192 Id. ("In October 1985, the Reagan Administration proposed the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI),

popularly called 'Star Wars,' ... for American territorial defense.").
193 Id.
194 See id. (discussing the "eight-year battle" that followed this action).
195
See id. ("[N]umerous present and former government officials ... rallied in support of the original

treaty interpretation.").
196

See id. (discussing the various fora in which the "controversy raged").

197

Id.

198

Id. at 2602. ("[I]ntemational law norms ... help construct national identities and interests through a

process ofjustificatory discourse.").
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the profiling of aliens because proscription conforms to their internalized norms
and the international norm. 199 With multiple discussions and debates on the use
of profiling by law enforcement agencies post-9/1 1 in Congressional hearings,
journals, newspapers, and even on television, 2°° the norm that profiling in any
context is wrong may be internalized by the United States. This internalization
could then lead to action by the judiciary to limit the Plenary Power Doctrine that
allows profiling in the name of national security. 2 °'
VIII. Conclusion
There is no question that the practice of profiling aliens has permeated
into United States' immigration law enforcement policies. 202 As research and
personal accounts tell us, post-9/1 I use of profiling by law enforcement targets
individuals of Middle-Eastern or South-Asian descent, many of whom are
Muslim. 20 3 The landmark case Lecraft v. Spain should call more attention to the
evils of discrimination and profiling, which chip away at fundamental constitutional liberties.204 If the HRC ruling declares racial profiling illegal under both
international law and the ICCPR, then the internalization of this international
norm by NGO's and state actors will help spur the judiciary to limit the Plenary
Power Doctrine to prohibit policies and laws that allow for the profiling of
aliens. Victims of profiling could then have a better way to defend themselves
against the imposition of restrictions on their freedom.

199
See id. at 2646 (stating the second step in the norm-internalization process includes seeking to
internalize the new international norm into the other party's internal normative system).
200
See id. at 2647 (stating how the mid-1980s ABM Treaty controversy was discussed and argued at

Senate hearings, debates over other arms control treaties, journal articles, and op-ed columns).
201
The Plenary Power Doctrine's vitality rests primarily on the fact "that it is so firmly embedded in
Supreme Court precedent that stare decisis plays a major role in keeping it alive" and thus "the Court could...
limit its force through the adoption and strengthening of other doctrines." Derek Ludwin, Can Courts Confer
Citizenship? Plenary Power and EqualProtection, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1376, 1384-85 (1999).
202
See generally Sharon L. Davies, Symposium: Reflections on the CriminalJustice System After
September 11, 2001: Profiling Terror, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 45 (2002).
203
SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES, supra note 28 (discussing accounts of ethnic and racial profiling where
the individuals detained were detained primarily because they were of Middle-Eastern descent).
204 The issues before the HRC are that the police action breached Lecraft's rights to non-discrimination
and freedom of movement and that racial discrimination has become ajus cogens of international law. The
HRC has stated: "[NIon-discrimination together with equality before the law and equal protection of the law
without any discrimination, constitute a basic and general principle relating to the protection of human rights."
Lecraft Communication, supra note 1.

